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The Americas have been a key driver of regional trade agreements (RTAs) since the 1990s. 
This study considers the effect of these agreements on trade liberalization, and the lessons 
that this offers for other parts of the world, notably Asia. It finds broad geographical coverage 
of RTAs in the Americas, and evidence that these agreements have broadened and 
deepened liberalization. It stresses the importance of looking beyond tariffs on goods, to 
consider liberalization of services and removal of non-tariff barriers, both for academics 
assessing the true extent of liberalization, and for policymakers looking to ensure well-
functioning RTAs. It suggests that RTAs can encourage broader liberalization in Asia, but 
some sectors will be resistant to liberalization. Moreover, efforts must be made to harmonize 
the provisions of RTAs, to avoid costly multiplication of rules and to ensure a web of bilateral 
deals does not undermine multilateral trade. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The countries of the Americas
1
Figure 1:  Regional Trade Agreements Notified to the WTO in the Americas and 
around the World, 2007 
 have been key drivers of the now-global spree of regional 
trade agreements (RTAs). Collectively, the economies of the  region have notified three 
dozen intra- and extra-regional RTAs to the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Figure 1), and 
are negotiating several more. As major contributors to the global “spaghetti bowl” of RTAs, 
and as the source of nearly a fifth of global trade, the countries of the Americas can also play 
a major role, if not serve as the focal point, in the search for better models of regional 






























Regional Trade  Agreements in the Rest of the World
Regional Trade  Agreements with a Country of the Americas  
Source: IDB calculations based on WTO information. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent of liberalization in RTAs in the Americas 
in comparison with other regions of the world, to discuss the potential future of integration in 
the region, including multilateralizing regional RTAs, and to draw lessons from the Americas 
for other regions, particularly Asia. While primarily focusing on market access for goods—
and tariff liberalization schedules, in particular—we also explore the regional RTAs’ 
provisions on rules of origin, investment, and services. The analysis centers on the depth of 
liberalization accomplished by the region’s RTAs; however, we also begin to investigate the 
extent to which those RTAs feature “open regionalism”—liberalization vis-à-vis third parties.   
We reach two main conclusions. First, the Americas are a notably liberalized region in terms 
of the maturity, geographical coverage, and depth of its RTAs. Rather than the pursuit of 
new negotiations, the region’s main challenge today is to generate further synergies 
between existing agreements, while at the same time forging or strengthening extra-regional 
ties with Europe, the countries of Asia, and other third parties.  Multilateralization in the 
Americas is somewhat elusive and should be considered as a process, rather than an 
                                                 
1 Due to methodological issues, “Americas” and “hemispheric” refer in this paper to a group comprised of 
Canada; the Dominican Republic; Mexico; Central and South America; and the United States. ADBI Working Paper 277    Estevadeordal, Shearer, and Suominen 
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immediate end-goal; perhaps the most attainable and useful  next stage in the region’s 
integration process is convergence between the many intra-regional agreements.  
Second, RTAs in Asia are today proliferating in a similar fashion to those in the Americas a 
few years ago. Indeed, much like in the Americas, the proliferation of bilateral RTAs is 
threatening to overshadow broader, region-wide integration efforts. Perhaps the main insight 
from the Americas for the future of Asian regionalism is that the web of multiple RTAs can be 
beneficial in terms of opening new market access channels, as well as potentially allowing 
for deeper liberalization than a region- or worldwide mega-agreement could. However, the 
regional RTAs will have to be liberalizing both internally and externally, firmly based on open 
regionalism, so as to create trade and be conducive to multilateralizing regionalism.  
Furthermore, absent global free trade, the Asian “noodle bowl” of RTAs, much like the 
American RTA spaghetti, risks “lost” scale economies and high transaction costs. A key 
short-term solution would be to find common ground for a broad-based regional integration 
scheme or fold the regional RTAs into a region-wide arrangement. Given the proliferation of 
trans-Pacific RTAs, a further, complementary avenue would be to pursue convergence of 
RTAs in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) space, or even more broadly 
between the countries of Asia and the Americas. 
The following section takes stock of the advance of regional integration in the Americas, and 
details the “liberalization state of play” in the RTAs formed by the countries of the Americas. 
The third section surveys the extent of open regionalism in the Americas. Section four 
examines investment and services provisions. The fifth section explores potential future 
pathways for regional integration in the Americas, and discusses the lessons of regionalism 
in that region for Asia. Section six concludes.  
2.  LIBERALIZATION IN RTAS IN THE AMERICAS 
This section focuses on the depth of liberalization in RTAs formed by the countries of the 
Americas in a comparative perspective over the past decade, and into the next 20 years. 
The first part describes the advance of integration in the regional economies’ trade policy 
portfolios. The second part centers on the liberalization statistics.  
2.1  RTA Pathways in the Americas: From Intra-Regionalism to 
Transcontinentalism  
Countries in different regions of the world have had distinct RTA paths over the past two 
decades among four main “stations”: intra-regional blocs, intra-regional bilateral RTAs, 
continental “megablocs”, and transcontinental RTAs. In the Americas, the common path has 
been from intra-regional blocs to an attempted megabloc, accompanied and followed by 
intra-regional bilateral agreements and, subsequently, trans-continental RTAs.  
The first RTAs were intra-regional customs unions formed (or reformed) in the early 1990s—
the  Andean Community, Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Central American Common 
Market (CACM), and the Southern Common Market (Mercosur). The North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), launched in 1994, connected Canada, Mexico, and the United 
States (US). The same year, the  first Summit of the Americas launched the 34-country 
negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which was to merge the 
aspiring customs unions and NAFTA under a single umbrella. Bilateral agreements 
proceeded in parallel, particularly between Mexico and Chile on the one hand, and 
numerous other countries of the region on the other. The stagnation of the FTAA talks in 
2003 furthered and “regionalized” the quest for bilateral intra-regional FTAs, some results 
being the Mercosur-Andean Community FTAs of 2004, the US-Central America-Dominican ADBI Working Paper 277    Estevadeordal, Shearer, and Suominen 
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Republic FTA (DR-CAFTA) of 2005, and, more recently,  the culmination of the US-
Colombia, US-Peru, US-Panama, Chile-Peru, and Chile-Colombia FTA negotiations.  
Intra-regionalism is today yielding to a transcontinental approach. Many regional countries 
have sought to establish an early foothold in Asia’s fast-growing RTA panorama. Chile has 
been an early leader. In 2003, Chile and the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea) signed the 
Asian country’s first comprehensive bilateral FTA, and in 2005, Chile concluded negotiations 
for a four-partite FTA (P-4) with Brunei Darussalam, New Zealand, and Singapore. An FTA 
between Chile and the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—the latter’s first extra-regional 
FTA—went into effect in October 2006, and in November 2006 Chile reached an FTA with 
Japan. Elsewhere, in 2003 the US and Singapore reached one of the first of Singapore’s 
now-extensive network of RTAs, and the US-Australia FTA entered into force in 2005. The 
Mexico-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, Japan’s first extra-regional free trade 
agreement, also took effect in 2005; and the same year, Peru and Thailand signed a bilateral 
FTA. FTAs took effect between Taipei, China and Panama in 2004 and Guatemala in 2006. 
Panama concluded FTA negotiations with Singapore in 2006, and Peru did so in May 2008.  
Trans-Pacific agreements are poised to expand: for instance, the US  has concluded 
negotiations with Korea, and Chile has launched talks with Malaysia. Furthermore, five 
countries of the Americas—Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and the US—are pursuing closer 
ties with Asia in the context of the APEC forum, founded in 1989. 
Countries of the Americas have also been reaching across the Atlantic for agreements with 
the European Union (EU). Mexico launched an FTA with the EU in 2000, as did Chile in 
2003. In May 2006, the EU and CACM countries announced the launch of comprehensive 
Association Agreement negotiations, while the EU-CARICOM talks have entered the final 
phase. The EU and the Andean Community have explored the opening of Association 
Agreement negotiations. Furthermore, besides the trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic fronts, 
Mercosur has concluded an agreement with India, and the US  is building a network of 
agreements with selected Middle Eastern countries.  
The geographic composition of trade flows of the countries of the Americas appears to have 
followed the advance of regionalism. The most notable change in the Latin American and 
Caribbean (LAC) export profile is the decline of Europe and rise in the importance of the 
intra-hemispheric market, as well as a moderate increase in the share of the Asia-Pacific 
region as an export destination. To be sure, there are wide intra-regional differences; 
countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru have seen their commodity exports to 
PRC surge markedly in their export baskets.  
Western Hemisphere exports, which include those of the US  and Canada, have grown, 
particularly in the North American market, again evincing the regionalization of trade. On the 
import side, however, Asia has penetrated the LAC market forcefully, contributing today 
about a fifth of the region’s imports. This appears to have come at the expense of Europe, 
whose import share in the region has shrunk to some 14% of the total. 
While trade per se has surged in importance for the regional output in the past two decades, 
so has the relevance of RTAs in governing the regional economies’ trade. For instance, the 
share of imports with RTA partners was 85% for Chile, 74% for Mexico, 45% for Argentina, 
and more than 30% for the US in 2006 (Figure 1). Of total intra-Americas trade, the share of 
trade among pairs with a common RTA rises to above 90% of the total; the level is still three-
quarters of all trade  when NAFTA is not taken into account. While these figures do not 
capture the level of trade that enters under the RTA regime, as opposed to most favored 
nation (MFN) or other regimes, they are indicative of the fact that a sizable share of the 
hemispheric economies’ trade is with their RTA partners—as well as that countries of the 
region have forged ties with some of their leading trade partners. ADBI Working Paper 277    Estevadeordal, Shearer, and Suominen 
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% of Imports from RTA Partners of Total Imports
Figure 2: Trade with Regional Trade Agreement Partners as Percentage of Total Trade 
in 2006, Selected Countries 
 ADBI Working Paper 277    Estevadeordal, Shearer, and Suominen 
 
5 
Source: IDB calculations based on United Nations Comtrade database, DESA/UNSD. 
2.2  The State of Integration in the Americas in Comparative 
Perspective 
This section strives to break new ground in dissecting the liberalization state of play in RTAs 
in the Americas. We focus on tariff liberalization schedules of 76 parties in 38 RTAs 
(Appendix I, Table A1).
2 Much of the data here draw on IDB (2006).
3 The first part of this 
section surveys the overall approach of the tariff liberalization regimes—divided here into 
basket, sectoral and preferential tariff approaches—among the 38 RTAs.
4
2.2.1  Empirical Survey: Tariff Liberalization Regime Models 
 The second part 
analyzes tariff-line data from the RTA parties’ tariff liberalization schedules, and also 
examines tariff rate quotas and exceptions and exclusions. The third part explores 
alternative measurements—share of liberalized tariff lines trade-weighted by Harmonized 
System chapters, and share of trade that is liberalized from the RTA partner in a given 
year—in sub-samples of 27 and 23 RTAs, respectively. We examine three sets of 
agreements—those formed in the Americas (here, “intra-regional”), those formed between a 
country of the Americas and a partner in another region (“inter-regional” or “Americas as 
Partner”), and agreements not involving any countries of the Americas (“extra-regional”). 
There are a number of models of tariff liberalization. The  basket approach assigns all 
products into a set of distinct categories in the tariff elimination program. The categories 
provide a time frame and trajectory towards complete elimination of tariffs (as opposed to 
providing only an end-point preferential tariff or preferential margin).  Also included are any 
tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), typically with a reference to an appendix with the quantities, as 
well as exceptions to preferential treatment (which are typically entered into a basket of 
continued MFN treatment).
5
The  US tends to follow the basket approach, generally subjecting nearly the entire tariff 
universe to eventual full  tariff elimination. Some of the less visible “action” in the US 
agreements can be found in the annexes on TRQs, where tariff liberalization generally takes 
place over longer time horizons and is accompanied by increasing in-quota quantities. Even 
sugar, a sensitive product from the US perspective that usually receives continued MFN 
  
                                                 
2  The tariff liberalization schedules were obtained from the Foreign Trade Information System at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/ and some national sources, including websites. Some tariff data was obtained from 
UNCTAD’s Trade Analysis and Information System. The study also maps out coverage in the RTAs of four 
trade disciplines besides tariffs, including non-tariff measures, rules of origin, special regimes, and customs 
procedures.  
3 There are a handful of other studies on tariff liberalization in RTAs. The World Trade Organization (2002) 
carried out an extensive inventory of the coverage and liberalization of tariff concessions in 47 RTAs of a total 
of 107 parties. The data cover tariff treatment of imports into parties to selected RTAs, tariff line treatment as 
obtained from individual countries’ tariff schedules, and tariff dispersion for a number of countries. Scollay 
(2005) performed a similarly rigorous analysis of tariff concessions in a sample of 18 RTAs. The IDB (2002) 
presented an exhaustive survey of market access commitments of RTAs in the Americas, while the World 
Bank (2005) carried out a more general mapping of the various disciplines in RTAs around the world. 
4 Various prior studies have characterized tariff elimination as carried out on the basis of a positive or a negative 
list, or as based on a certain formula. This study strives to abstract from these characteristics and classify 
liberalization programs by their categorization of goods into distinct paths of liberalization. Certainly, some of 
the categories are more aligned with a positive list approach, while others lend to a negative list approach. 
5 The Thailand-Australia and Thailand-New Zealand FTAs defy  easy categorization, as they do not use any 
clearly defined baskets, but, rather, implement staging simply by cross-tabbed reduced tariff rates. This lends 
itself mostly to the basket approach, due to the use of comprehensive schedules. However, there are a large 
number of case-by-case trajectories, which also suggests a preferential tariff approach. ADBI Working Paper 277    Estevadeordal, Shearer, and Suominen 
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treatment in most agreements, typically receives an increasing in-quota quantity (albeit from 
a small starting point).
6
The sector approach, typically favored by the EU and the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA), subjects all industrial products to a general tariff elimination schedule.
 
7
Still other agreements,  such as those forged under the Latin American Integration 
Association (LAIA) framework, emphasize the end-point preferential tariff or margin of 
preference. The Bangkok Agreement also focuses on the end-point preferences, with 
additional concessions provided to less developed RTA members. These models take a 
positive list approach to the concessions, whereby the schedules contain the products to 
which the market access provisions of the RTA apply (as opposed to the negative list 
approach, which catalogues the products to which the market access provisions do not 
apply).  
 A separate 
list of exceptions, and separate annexes or protocols, govern the treatment of such products 
as agriculture, fish, and processed agricultural goods. The protocols tend to be quite 
complex and feature various regimes, such as end-point preference margins or residual 
preferential tariffs, TRQs, reference quantities, and a phased reduction of tariffs to a final 
level (which is often non-zero). The sections referring to the scope of the agreement and 
definitions of certain product categories are as important to understanding the process of 
tariff reduction as is the section on the tariff reduction program itself.  
2.2.2  Tariff Liberalization 
Agreements formed in the Americas and particularly those signed by the NAFTA members 
generally liberalize trade quickly, with some three quarters of lines freed in the first year of 
the agreement. However, some of Mercosur’s agreements have somewhat more backloaded 
liberalization, with a large share of lines being liberalized in year six to year  10 of the 
agreements. Asia-Pacific RTAs stand out for being particularly frontloaded: they liberalize 
the bulk of the tariff universe in the first year of the RTA; this is in good part due to 
Singapore’s according duty-free treatment to all products upon the entry into force of its 
agreements. While the parties’ respective product coverages often diverge markedly in year 
five, with some countries (such as Korea) liberalizing up to twice as many lines as their 
partners (such as Chile), the differences shrink considerably by year 10. The wider gaps in 
concessions among a pair usually owe to North-South differences in liberalization—a pattern 
that is evident throughout the sample in all regions. Figure 3 disaggregates the liberalization 
schedules into three sets: those in RTAs signed in the Americas, those in RTAs between 
countries of  the Americas and extra-regional partners, and those in extra-regional 
agreements. The 90% threshold, which is often used as a benchmark for “substantially all 
trade”, is marked with a horizontal line.  
The figure echoes the prior findings in two ways. First, it shows that while some countries 
employ a “stair-step” approach to tariff liberalization, others have a constant percentage 
coverage of tariff lines in what could be characterized as a “now-or-never” approach. Still 
others travel from low to near-100% coverage in one or two jumps.  
                                                 
6 It should be noted that the in-quota quantities (and even the existence of in-quota treatment) in these 
agreements differ greatly within CAFTA. Although the US has given the same schedule with the same baskets 
to the other countries, the treatment within these baskets varies significantly between countries.  So although 
the statistics will reflect identical treatment of all Central American countries, this will not be the case, 
especially when considering that a number of the products subject to TRQs are those in which Central America 
will have a strong comparative advantage (sugar, for instance). 
7 The recent EU-Chile FTA that entered into effect in 2003 diverged from the EU’s standard practice of dividing 
tariff elimination into separate venues by establishing a single schedule for each party that contains all 
products. In its category column, the schedule includes various measures that will be maintained, such as 
TRQs, elimination of only the ad valorem component of a mixed duty (including in cases where the non ad 
valorem component is linked to an entry price), products subjected to a tariff concession of 50% of the basic 
customs duty, and cases where no liberalization takes place, for instance due to “protected denominations.” ADBI Working Paper 277    Estevadeordal, Shearer, and Suominen 
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Second, the averages of the three samples (in bold) reveal differences. Intra-regional 
agreements start from a low level of liberalization, but accelerate in the fourth year, 
surpassing the liberalization in extra-regional agreements by year nine. The inter-regional 
agreements start off more boldly, but are met by the intra-regional agreements in year 10. 
On average, a substantial part of liberalization in the intra-hemispheric agreements takes 
place in the interim period following entry into force (especially in years five to 10) as 
opposed to up front. This is due not only to a greater use of the stair-step approach, but also 
to the heterogeneity of the sample. The agreements between Central America, Mexico, and 
the US tend to be characterized by a large number of small steps, as are the US agreements 
with Peru and Colombia. However, Mexico’s agreements with Chile and Uruguay frontload 
concessions, and the Chile-Central America FTA and Canada’s agreements with Chile and 
Costa Rica fall somewhere between these two poles. 
The Southern Cone’s approach is different still. ACE 58 and ACE 59, the two Economic 
Complimentary Agreements between Mercosur and the Andean Community, start at a very 
low share of duty-free lines, and then increase substantially with a small number of large 
jumps after year five. This is most pronounced in Mercosur’s earlier agreements with Bolivia 
and Chile, where duty-free coverage is minimal through around year eight, and then quickly 
jumps to around 90% or more, followed by a slow progression towards near-full coverage 
later on. 
Most of the inter-regional agreements follow the stair-step model. In agreements involving a 
Northern and a Southern party, the latter generally starts at a lower initial point and takes 
larger steps than the Northern counterpart. This is particularly clear in the Korea-Chile FTA 
(with the former classified in economic terms as “North”), and US agreements with Jordan 
and Morocco. However, there are exceptions. Concessions are much more even in the EU-
Chile agreement; in the EFTA-Mexico FTA, Mexico’s schedule starts at around 40% of lines 
duty free and achieves over 90% (marked here with a horizontal line) within 10 years by 
means of a few jumps, actually surpassing Switzerland’s constant coverage of slightly less 
than 80% of lines. 
Extra-regional agreements exhibit a larger dispersion in tariff lowering. This can be explained 
in part by two counter-balancing forces. For one, the sample includes a number of 
agreements involving Singapore, where Singapore gives duty-free access to 100% of lines 
at the entry into force of the agreement.
8
                                                 
8 In the case of Australia and New Zealand’s agreements with Singapore, both parties provide immediate duty-
free access to 100% of tariff lines. 
 However, this is counterbalanced by agreements 
with low initial coverage and large jumps; these tend to be caused by the Southern parties in 
North-South agreements. PRC’s concession to Hong Kong, China, is an extreme example, 
with duty-free coverage starting around 4% and then jumping to 100% in year three. 
Accentuating the flatness of the extra-regional average are Japan’s schedule for Singapore, 
and the EU’s concessions to Morocco and Lithuania. Since the “flat” schedules in these 
agreements entail coverage well below 100%, they serve to moderate the behavior of the 
overall extra-regional average, as well. ADBI Working Paper 277    Estevadeordal, Shearer, and Suominen 
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Source: IDB calculations based on agreement documents. 
Figure 4 goes beyond the 2007 snapshot to explore the entire period from 1994 to 2026. The 
bold line maps out the simple average for the intra-regional sample from 2007 onward (i.e., 
during the period when all the agreements are expected to be in force). The main finding is 
the extent of deep liberalization throughout the Americas: as of today, most RTA members 
have liberalized more than four-fifths of the tariff items with their partners; some of the newer 
FTAs will attain this level by 2010. Liberalization in the recent Mercosur-Andean agreements 
is more limited, reaching between a fifth and a quarter of tariff lines by 2010.  
Overall, the figure conveys the maturity of liberalization in intra-regional agreements in the 
Americas: even with the slower pace of the Mercosur-Andean agreements, the regional 
agreements will have freed more than 90% of lines by 2012 and more than 95% by 2015. It 
is true that extra-regional agreements only lag this by a year, but the ongoing proliferation of 
FTAs in Asia would pull down the average if newer agreements were included. In contrast, 
the Americas are close to saturation in terms of intra-regional agreements, which means that 
the figure gives an accurate picture of the future of such liberalization. ADBI Working Paper 277    Estevadeordal, Shearer, and Suominen 
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Source: IDB calculations based on agreement documents. 
The aggregate tariff reduction statistics disguise an important variation in the speed of 
liberalization between agricultural and industrial goods. Agricultural products in each region 
are more protected, and for longer, than industrial products. Among the full sample of all 
agreements, RTAs liberalize an average of only 61% of tariff lines in agriculture by year five 
and 78% by year 10, while reaching duty-free treatment for 77% and 94% of industrial goods 
by the same points in time. However, notably, intra-regional FTAs in the Americas take off in 
agricultural liberalization in year 10, surpassing the other regional groups. This is largely due 
to very large jumps (in the order of 60 percentage points or more) in agricultural duty-free 
coverage in the Mercosur-Bolivia and Mercosur-Chile agreements, as well as smaller 
increases in the Mexico-Nicaragua and Mexico-Costa Rica FTAs and the representative 
average Central American countries’ schedule in CAFTA vis-à-vis the US. Peru’s agricultural 
concession to Mercosur also increased substantially in year 10.  
In industrial goods, both intra-regional FTAs, and FTAs with a country of the Americas as a 
partner, feature progressively deeper liberalization, with the take-off again occurring in year 
10. In fact, the trajectories of the agricultural versus industrial goods for the three subsets of 
agreements almost appear as parallel lines, with industry simply starting at a higher intercept 
on the vertical axis. In the intra-regional sphere, the jump in year 10 is in part due to 
Mexico’s industrial coverage in NAFTA rising from 72% to 100% that year. In trans-Pacific 
agreements, there is a very large jump in Mexico’s coverage of Japan’s industrial products 
that year.  
On average, RTA parties from all samples liberalize well below half of tariff lines in the most 
sensitive chapters—dairy (chapter 04) and sugars (17) by the fifth year of the agreement, 
and less than 55% in several others, including meat, cocoa, prepared cereals and baked 
goods, tobacco, and footwear (02, 17, 18, 24, and 64, respectively), while sugar and dairy 
still remain below 60% at year 10. However, it is intra-regional agreements that are driving 
much of the overall protectionism in dairy, sugar, and footwear. Moreover, there is great ADBI Working Paper 277    Estevadeordal, Shearer, and Suominen 
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variation in the treatment of chapters at the intra-regional level—even among those that are 
relatively liberalized.  
Meanwhile, the extra-regional sample even at the five-year benchmark resembles the overall 
findings at year 10, stretching over a wide range from the highly liberalized to the more 
protected. The inter-regional sample falls somewhere in between. Agreements involving 
Singapore tend to increase the averages of all chapters in the extra-regional sample, and to 
a lesser extent, in the inter-regional sample. 
Encouragingly, however, RTA parties on average liberalize more than 75% of tariff lines in 
the bulk of chapters by year five and more than 90% of tariff lines in most chapters by year 
10. The fastest and deepest liberalization is effected in such non-sensitive products as ores 
(chapter 26), fertilizers (31), wood pulp (47), and some base metals (81); perhaps because 
these are intermediate inputs into other products. There is, however, notable variation 
across countries of the Americas in these goods, as well as in leather (chapter 42). Still, 
overall the intra-regional set now resembles the 10-year figure for the full sample.
9
2.2.3  TRQs and Exceptions 
 
RTAs around the world today are broad and highly liberalizing. Yet at the same time, these 
RTAs carry provisions that could potentially be classified as “other restrictive regulations of 
commerce” under Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), such 
as TRQs, exceptions, and demanding rules of origin (RoO). Such provisions can qualify the 
market access provided for in the tariff lowering schedules—and, as such, affect the degree 
of liberalization conferred by RTAs.  
TRQs in RTAs are usually additional to TRQ entitlements under the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture, so that the RTA parties’ existing entitlements are not affected. Figure 5 maps out 
the use of TRQs in the three sets of data. Countries of the Americas, like parties to extra-
regional agreements, are frequent TRQ users particularly in agriculture, but also employ 
TRQs in textiles, unlike their extra-regional counterparts. In the Americas, US agreements 
drive the TRQ incidence in agriculture, with Canada and Mexico contributing to a somewhat 
lesser extent.  
Exceptions in most RTAs also fall on the most tariff protected sectors—agricultural products, 
food preparations, chemicals, and textiles and apparel. In the Americas, Mexico’s 
agreements are the main drivers of exceptions in agriculture. Mexico-Northern Triangle, 
Chile-Central America, and Canada-Costa Rica FTAs contribute to the count in a broad 
number of sections. At the extra-regional level, EU agreements and the Japan-Singapore 
FTA drive the figures.  
                                                 
9 It is true that simply measuring the share of liberalized tariff lines fails to capture the full effects stemming from 
the exclusion of sensitive products from RTAs if those products are covered in a very small number of tariff lines. 
However, the picture of integration in the Americas does not change with alternative measures—liberalization as 
a share of tariff lines with data on trade flows, or duty-free treatment as a share of liberalized imports from the 
trade partner.  
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Figure 5: Percentage of RTAs with TRQs, by Region and Harmonized System Section 









































In sum, the analysis of liberalization in RTAs yields three main results:  
RTAs formed by the countries of the Americas are unique in three ways, in comparison to 
other regions: they are mature, most of them are highly encompassing, and in several cases, 
for instance RTAs signed by the original NAFTA members, they liberalize most products 
very rapidly (usually around 70% in the first year). In contrast, agreements in Asia are young, 
less encompassing, and, like European agreements, more “backloaded”. Singapore is a 
clear exception; it liberalizes basically all goods in the first year.  
There are similarities between the Americas and the extra-regional sample. Most extra-
regional agreements, like those formed by countries of the Americas, liberalize 90% of tariff 
lines (as well as trade-weighted lines) by year 10 into the agreement. As such, the coverage 
of products in all RTAs tends to become rather homogeneous by the end of the first decade.  
However, all three samples carry a number of outlier RTA parties (often Southern parties) 
and product categories (particularly in sensitive sectors—agricultural  products, food 
preparations, textiles and apparel, and footwear) that trail the overall trend of liberalization. 
Many agreements in the Americas and elsewhere also carry provisions that could potentially 
be classified as “other restrictive regulations of commerce”, such as tariff rate quotas and 
exceptions. This appears to indicate that such instruments are the price integrationist 
interests have to pay for broad and liberalizing RTAs.  
3.  OPEN REGIONALISM IN THE AMERICAS? 
The Americas are one of the most integrated regions in the world. Liberalization within its 
regional RTAs is deep and many countries of the Americas are connected to most others in 
the region. But how discriminatory are agreements formed by countries in the Americas? Are 
RTAs in the region based on “open regionalism”—in other words, has regional liberalization 
proceeded in parallel with multilateral liberalization—and have the region’s RTAs created, 
rather than diverted, trade? The first part of this section examines this question in a 
preliminary fashion by engaging applied external tariffs and rules of origin. The second part 
discusses some recent empirical findings on the trade effects of RTAs in the Americas and 
beyond. 
3.1  Multilateral Tariffs in the Americas 
In the 1990s, MFN liberalization in the Americas proceeded in lock-step with RTA 
liberalization, but the more recent period has seen fewer changes in Western Hemisphere 
countries’ external tariffs: the proliferation of RTAs has been accompanied by little additional 
downward movement on external tariffs. In general, however, the region’s most liberalized 
countries in the RTA sphere today also have the lowest MFN tariffs and least tariff 
dispersion.  
Figure  6  charts  the regional economies’ and PRC, EU, India, and Japan’s applied tariff 
profiles. The median chapter average of applied external tariffs in Latin America ranges from 
around 14% (Colombia) to 6% (Chile). The regional median is not very different from that of 
PRC; however, all Latin American countries have a lower median than is applied by India. 
US and Canadian tariffs are 2.8% and 3.5%, respectively. Tariff dispersion in the Americas 
is rather moderate, barring extreme outliers such as Mexico (meat, cereals, and tobacco), 
and Costa Rica and Panama (dairy). Dispersion across countries by chapter is moderate, 
but outliers persist in textiles (Mexico) and agriculture (India, EU, Mexico, and the US, 
among others). Average tariffs are also higher in these sectors. 
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Source: IDB calculations based on UNCTAD TRAINS data. 
Whether the Americas feature less or more discrimination than in the late 1990s requires a 
more detailed analysis than performed here. However, it appears that the advance of RTA 
liberalization has been accompanied by a more modest liberalization of external tariffs in the 
past few years than was the case in the 1990s. Moreover, while the formation of new RTAs 
has left fewer countries of the region subject to such tariffs, it has also accentuated the 
disadvantages of remaining outside the RTA spaghetti bowl.  
3.2  Rules of Origin 
RoO are widely considered a trade policy instrument that can work to offset the benefits of 
tariff liberalization in RTAs.
10
                                                 
10 Most prominently, RoO can be employed to favor intra-RTA industry linkages over those between the RTA and 
the rest of the world, providing indirect protection to RTA-based input producers (Krueger 1993; Krishna and 
Krueger 1995). As such, RoO are akin to a tariff on the intermediate product levied by the country importing the 
final good (Falvey and Reed 2000; Lloyd 2001). 
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prevent them from using some inputs in each final product. This can limit the access of 
member country producers to inputs from the rest of the world, and limit input providers’ 
sales to the RTA region. Moreover, the potential effects of RoO will only accentuate: RoO 
remain in place even after preferential tariffs have been phased out.   
While agreements in the Americas are among the most liberalizing in the world, particularly 
agreements forged by the original NAFTA partners, they also carry some of the most 
complex and restrictive rules of origin.
11
Furthermore, North America in particular is marked by a trend toward market-friendly rules of 
origin. US RoO regimes have evolved toward a more liberal framework from NAFTA to the 
US-Chile FTA, CAFTA, and the US-Colombia and US-Peru FTAs. Moreover, the NAFTA 
RoO regime itself has undergone a liberalization process, with more flexible RoO adopted in 
sectors as varied as alcoholic beverages, petroleum, chassis fitted with engines, 
photocopiers, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, plastics and rubber, motor vehicles and their 
parts, footwear, and copper.  
 Encouragingly, however, unlike the straitjacket RoO 
model that the EU uses in all of its RTAs, agreements in the Americas are marked by 
diversity, which suggests accommodation of RTA-specific idiosyncrasies. The regional 
countries have also employed such measures as short supply clauses, to help producers 
adjust to shocks in availability of intra-regional inputs.  
3.3  Economic Effects of RTAs in the Americas: Trade Creation or 
Trade Diversion? 
The academic literature remains divided as to whether RTAs are ultimately trade-creating or 
trade–diverting—and whether RTAs are a stepping stone or a stumbling block to global free 
trade.
12
For many authors such as Van der Mensbrugghe, Newfarmer,  and  Pierola  (2005);  and 
Schott (2004), much depends on the exact characteristics of RTAs. Aghion, Antràs, and 
Helpman (2006) arrived at two equilibria: one in which global free trade is attained only when 
preferential trade agreements are permitted to form (a building block effect), and another in 
which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are forbidden (a 
stumbling block effect). Still, most analysts, while seeing RTAs as the second-best option to 
multilateral free trade, prefer them to not liberalizing at all.  
 Deardorff and Stern (1994); Baldwin (1993, 2006); Wei and Frankel (1995); 
Bergsten (1995);  Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1997); Ethier (1998);  Cadot,  De Melo, and 
Olarreaga (2001); Freund (2000); and Ornelas (2005), and, on the political science side, Oye 
(1992),  and Kahler (1995), have provided grounds for believing that RTAs can be ever-
expanding and propel strategic interactions conducive to global free trade. In contrast, 
Bhagwati (1993) argued that reduced protection between RTA members will be 
accompanied by increased protection compared to outsiders, with RTAs ultimately 
undermining multilateral liberalization. Cooper (2004) held that FTAs can divert attention and 
resources away from multilateral liberalization efforts.  
There are few studies that consider tariff concessions directly. Limão (2006) found that the 
US and the EU have limited their multilateral tariff liberalization in goods traded with their 
RTA partners. Limão and Olarreaga (2006) reached similar conclusions in the case of import 
subsidies afforded to RTA partners by the US, the EU, and Japan.  
However, Estevadeordal and Robertson (2004) and Estevadeordal, Freund and Ornelas 
(2005), studying tariff liberalization in a number of Western Hemisphere RTAs, found that 
                                                 
11 See Suominen (2004), Estevadeordal and Suominen (2006), and Estevadeordal, Harris, and Suominen (2007). 
12 For early works on the welfare effects of RTAs and customs unions, in particular, see Viner (1950), Meade 
(1955), Lipsey (1960), Johnson (1965), Mundell (1964), Corden (1972), and Kemp and Wan (1976). 
Richardson (1994) and Panagariya and Findlay (1996) extended the political economy analysis of RTA 
formation to look at the welfare implications of endogenously determined RTAs.  ADBI Working Paper 277    Estevadeordal, Shearer, and Suominen 
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RTAs in the Americas have not only been liberalizing and conducive to trade in the region, 
but have actually helped further multilateral liberalization. The latter authors examined the 
effects of RTAs on external trade liberalization using industry-level data on applied MFN 
tariffs and bilateral preferences for ten Latin American countries from 1989-2001. The results 
show that the greater the tariff preference that a country gives to its RTA partners in a given 
product, the more the country tends to reduce its MFN tariff in that product. The authors 
conclude that RTAs can further encourage regionalism, and set in motion a dynamic that 
reduces their potential trade-diversionary effects.  
Analyses of tariffs on goods only provide a limited view of RTAs’ effects. RTAs formed by 
countries in the Americas, much like RTAs around the world, tackle a host of issues beyond 
tariffs ranging from investment to competition policy, labor issues to dispute settlement; 
standards to government procurement and transportation. As has been discussed, some 
RTA disciplines, such as TRQs, special safeguards, non-tariff measures, and, in particular, 
rules of origin can limit the extent of market access provided by tariff liberalization, distorting 
import patterns.  
Suominen (2004) and Estevadeordal and Suominen (2006b) found that while RTAs help 
create trade, restrictive RoO embedded in them dampen their trade-creating potential. 
Meanwhile, restrictive RoO in final goods encourage trade in intermediate goods, and can 
thus entail trade diversion in inputs. Estevadeordal, López-Córdova, and Suominen (2006) 
extended the analysis of the effects of RoO to investment flows in manufacturing industries 
in Mexico, finding that investment in Mexico during the NAFTA era has been attracted to 
sectors with flexible RoO—those which allow industries to establish production and supply 
networks of global reach, and do not limit them to NAFTA-based partners. 
4.  BEYOND MARKET ACCESS: SERVICES AND 
INVESTMENT 
This section strives to supplement the tariff liberalization statistics by providing a brief 
comparative analysis of the coverage (rather than depth of liberalization) of investment and 
services provisions (listed in Appendix II) in agreements formed by countries of the 
Americas, relative to arrangements in other regions as well as multilateral agreements 
(General Agreement on Trade in Services, GATS, and Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures, TRIMS). The main question examined here is not the extent of 
liberalization by RTAs, but, rather,  the extent of their comprehensiveness. As such, this 
analysis can help elucidate the extent to which RTAs are “WTO+”, in terms of incorporating 
more, and more specific, provisions than are present in the multilateral regime. 
Services chapters in RTAs usually only cover modes 1 and 2 (cross-border supply and 
consumption abroad) and are, therefore, separate from RTA chapters on other  forms of 
trade in services: investment and temporary entry of business persons. RTAs generally 
cover a large number of services provisions, particularly most favored nation treatment, 
national treatment, market access, local presence, domestic regulation, recognition of 
qualifications, transparency, restriction of transfers, and denial of benefits. Many RTAs also 
contain provisions (whether in different chapters or in annexes to the services chapters) for 
telecommunications and financial services. 
Intra-hemispheric RTAs are particularly comprehensive and often go well beyond GATS 
provisions (Figure 7). Older agreements such as NAFTA, the first to cover services in an 
exhaustive manner, cover MFN treatment, national treatment, market access, local 
presence, domestic regulation, recognition of qualifications, transparency, restriction of 
transfers and denial of benefits, as well as containing certain provisions for 
telecommunications and financial services. The coverage of services in these two sectors 
has intensified in recent US agreements with Chile, Peru, Colombia and Panama, and, at the ADBI Working Paper 277    Estevadeordal, Shearer, and Suominen 
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inter-regional front, with Australia, Singapore, and Morocco. In contrast, most South 
American agreements do not have specific services provisions.  
Overall, this means that more than 60% of inter- and intra-regional agreements cover MFN 
treatment, national treatment, market access, and unnecessary barriers to trade, and 
prohibit discriminatory treatment—all areas addressed by fewer extra-regional agreements, 
which are much thinner with the exception of Japan-Singapore, which covers national 
treatment, market access, domestic regulation, recognition of qualifications, transparency 
and restriction of transfers, as well as certain provisions on telecommunications and financial 
services.  
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Source: IDB calculations based on agreement documents. 
As in services, the latest RTAs’ investment chapters tend to be broad, extending to such 
areas as MFN treatment, national treatment, transparency, denial of benefits and restriction 
of transfers, nationality of management and board of directors, performance requirements, 
expropriation, and investor–state disputes. 
It is intra-hemispheric RTAs, and US RTAs in particular, that are comprehensive—and often 
extend well beyond GATS and TRIMs (Figure 8). Indeed, all RTAs forged in the Americas 
apply the four modalities of investment—establishment, acquisition, post-establishment 
operations and resale—and also cover such disciplines as MFN treatment, national 
treatment, and dispute settlement. Eighty percent or more also cover transparency, denial of 
benefits and restriction of transfers, nationality of management and board of directors, 
performance requirements and expropriation. In inter-regional agreements, the coverage is 
somewhat lower due to the limited coverage of disciplines in the EU-Mexico and EU-Chile 
agreements, as well as in the Chile-PRC and US-Jordan FTAs, and the P-4 agreement.  ADBI Working Paper 277    Estevadeordal, Shearer, and Suominen 
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Source: IDB calculations based on agreement documents. 
In sum, there is marked variation across RTAs in the coverage of services and investment 
provisions. Yet, the analysis also communicates clustering of RTAs by main regions—Asia, 
Europe, North America, and South America. A closer inspection of the data also suggests 
the export of RTA models from one region to the next through trans-continental RTAs, such 
as the “borrowing” of some of the US-Chile RTA’s market access provisions in the Chile-
Korea RTA. Many US RTAs in particular could be viewed as WTO+ in terms of incorporating 
more, and more specific, provisions than are present in the multilateral regime. 
5.  THE FUTURE AND LESSONS OF REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION IN THE AMERICAS  
5.1  Managing the Integration Architecture in the Americas  
The countries of the Americas are at a crossroads: their intra-regional integration is 
increasingly complete and mature, and many regional countries have already established 
ties with numerous extra-regional partners. The advance of regional trade agreements in the 
trade portfolios of the countries of the Americas has created benefits in terms of expanded 
market access, greater trade and investment flows, increased firm productivity, and arguably 
also macroeconomic stability (IDB 2002).  
However, at the same time, the regional economies have yet to optimize their RTA 
portfolios: much work remains in alleviating the domestic, supply-side constraints to trade. 
Furthermore, the spread of RTAs across the region in the past several years has forged a 
“spaghetti bowl” of multiple and often overlapping agreements. This, in turn, entails a 
number of risks.  
Most immediately, the proliferation of RTAs can “balkanize” the regional and global trading 
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transactions costs for traders, investors, and governments operating on several RTA fronts 
simultaneously.  
The spread of RTAs also risks the rise of hub-and-spoke systems centered around a few 
major trading countries, where the potential cost savings from trade among the spokes 
remain untapped. Furthermore, the rise of RTAs means that while any given country will 
likely be an insider to a number of RTAs, it will also be an outsider to dozens of others. As 
such, even the most prolific integrator countries can end up facing some degree of 
discrimination and preference erosion around the world.  
Encouragingly, the countries of the Americas have a number of strategic options to reduce 
the potentially negative RTA spaghetti bowl effects, while also deepening the benefits of the 
hard-won RTAs. The first, and most preferable, option would be to pursue deep global trade 
liberalization and multilateral harmonization of trade rules. This would resolve the spaghetti 
bowl problems in a single act. However, the odds of this option bearing fruit are low, 
especially in the near-term, and it is something over which the countries of the Americas 
have only limited control.  
The second main option would be to pursue a broader integration scheme in the Americas. 
Essentially superseding the RTAs criss-crossing the hemisphere, such a mega-regional 
agreement would also streamline the regional trade architecture and sort out the regional 
RTA spaghetti: traders, investors, and customs authorities would need only to refer to one 
single agreement on such issues  as market access and rules of origin, services and 
investment regulations, standards, dispute settlement, and so on. Akin to the projected 
FTAA, a region-wide RTA would also help circumvent the rise of hub-and-spoke systems 
and end the increasing discrimination stemming from the proliferation of RTAs. Moreover, 
provided it were based on open regionalism and firmly nested in the WTO system, such a 
scheme would create trade also with non-members, and could even help propel multilateral 
talks forward. However, this approach of starting from scratch is also problematic, in light of 
the great variety of preferential agreements already in place in the region.   
The third strategic alternative, and perhaps the most feasible one in the short-run, would be 
to build bridges among the existing RTAs—to strive for some form of convergence or 
gradual harmonization of the various RTAs in the Americas. The starting point and initial 
focus of such an effort could be market access provisions and rules of origin, in particular. 
While differing in process from efforts to reach a mega-regional agreement, bridging RTAs 
would have similar effects to a single integration agreement. It would facilitate trade and 
production across the region, and, as such, harness hemispheric scale economies and 
opportunities for cost-savings. It could also undermine protectionist interests and prospects 
for trade diversion, and serve as a base for further region-wide and global negotiations.  
Convergence of RTAs could make the whole spaghetti bowl “greater than the sum of its 
strings”, and in fact there are already some efforts in the region toward convergence. In 
January 2007, the Pacific Basin Forum of 11 countries in Latin America, including Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, and Peru, formed a work agenda to study, among other things, trade convergence 
and integration (Arco del Pacífico Latinoamericano 2007a, 2007b). The group, which has 
received technical support from the IDB,
13
The fourth option would be to “multilateralize” RTAs in the region. This would entail 
deepening tariff liberalization among RTA members, lowering discrimination toward non-
members, and reducing substantive differences among the various RTAs. However, since 
these measures are rather theoretical than within immediate reach, multilateralization can be 
best conceived as a process that drives toward these outcomes.  
 has held  several  meetings, furthering the 
understanding of the tangible ways to achieve convergence. 
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Conceptually, the multilateralization process would entail three alternative (yet 
complementary) paths: multilateral, regional and two-way paths.  
The multilateral path would entail changing, or at least making more precise, the multilateral 
rules governing RTAs, particularly the rather vague requirement of the GATT Article XXIV 
that RTAs liberalize “substantially all trade” among the partners and eradicate “restrictive 
regulations on commerce” within a “reasonable length of time”, and not raise new barriers to 
trade vis-à-vis non-members. For transparency purposes, the multilateral path could also 
require strengthening of the procedures for notifying RTAs to the WTO and for reviewing 
their compliance with Article XXIV.  
The regional path could be paved with measures within each individual RTA, or among 
groups of RTAs. The former would mean driving down intra-RTA barriers and lowering 
discrimination toward non-members (or incorporating new members). The latter could entail 
convergence—merging RTAs together in broader zones through the adoption of common 
rules and regulations—while driving to the lowest common denominator in external 
protection.  
The two-way path would entail using the regional level to shape rule-making at the 
multilateral level and vice versa. For instance, it could mean using the empirical facts on 
liberalization and external discrimination in RTAs, something this paper has sought to 
establish, as a reality check in multilateral rule making on RTAs. It could also mean 
transposing tried and tested trade-related disciplines in RTAs that currently go beyond 
multilateral rules in coverage, precision, or both (such as services and customs procedures), 
in crafting new multilateral trade rules.  
Conversely, the two-way path could mean including new multilateral rules governing RTAs in 
RTA texts and even some mechanisms to enforce compliance with multilateral mandates at 
the regional level. It could also entail multilateral rules to govern regional convergence 
processes, to ensure that expanded RTA zones would not result in discrimination toward 
non-members. 
Besides the political opposition to multilateralization, however accomplished, the risk to be 
managed in any of these processes would be one of incentives. Stronger multilateral rules 
on RTAs and their enforcement could turn countries away from regionalism, while doing little 
to encourage them to turn their energies to multilateralism. Moreover, in the absence of 
multilateral opening, convergence among RTAs could lead to trade being diverted. A two-
way path risks straitjacketing regions with unsuitable multilateral rules and succumbing to 
the political economy of RTAs at the multilateral level. 
5.2  Lessons for Asia 
RTAs in Asia are proliferating rapidly. Much as in the Americas, Asian bilateral RTAs have 
been catalyzed by a broader intra-regional integration scheme, APEC, but they are now 
starting to eclipse the broader region-wide effort. This picture presents both the challenge of 
an unruly noodle bowl of RTAs, as well as the opportunity for furthering the market access 
gains attained in the various agreements. There are perhaps four key insights from the spree 
of integration in the Americas for Asian regionalism: 
RTAs help open new market access channels and likely enable the attainment of deeper 
liberalization than a region-wide mega-agreement or a global agreement would. However, 
care must be taken to pursue RTAs that are internally deeply liberalizing and externally 
firmly based on open regionalism. The agreements in the Americas forged from the mid-
1990s onward have by and large been such, and consequently delivered far greater gains 
from trade than the region’s patchy and inward-looking regionalism of the 1980s.  
Regionalism and multilateralism can be complementary: liberalization in one sphere can 
beget opening in another. There is an important body of anecdotal information and recent ADBI Working Paper 277    Estevadeordal, Shearer, and Suominen 
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rigorous econometric work to this effect  on the interplay of RTAs and  multilateral 
liberalization. However, analyses also show that many RTAs contain “hidden protectionism”, 
such as opaque non-tariff measures and restrictive rules of origin. While these instruments 
may be the political price of passing RTAs, they can also dampen RTAs’ trade-creating 
potential and contravene open regionalism.  
Absent global free trade, the Asian noodle bowl of RTAs risks “lost” scale economies and 
high transactions costs, just as does the RTA spaghetti in the Americas. The key solution 
would be to find common ground for a broad-based regional integration scheme or fold the 
common agreements into a region-wide arrangement, which is internally and externally at 
least as liberalizing as the most liberal RTA in the region (rather than settling for the lowest 
common denominator). In light of the multiple trans-Pacific RTAs, a further, complementary 
avenue would be to pursue convergence in the APEC space, or even more broadly, between 
the countries of Asia and the Americas.  
Going from potential to actual convergence and multilateralization not only faces numerous 
practical hurdles, but also requires political capital and attention. Bridging RTAs is bound to 
be complex, particularly considering the several regional RTAs and the vast range of 
provisions in the various agreements that would have to be reconciled. The first step might 
therefore be to launch a regional mechanism—perhaps a technical group of experts—that 
monitors and catalogues RTA tariffs and rules, reports to the members on the existing 
provisions, solicits views from stakeholders about the functioning and pitfalls of the status 
quo network of agreements, and puts forth technical proposals for bridging RTAs.   
6.  CONCLUSION 
We have found that RTAs in the Americas are among the most liberalized in the world. As in 
other regions, though, there are a number of outlier RTA parties and product categories in 
the Americas that remain closed for extended periods of time. RTAs formed by the countries 
of the Americas also carry a number of trade policy instruments, such as TRQs and 
exclusions, that can curb liberalization among the parties, and restrictive rules of origin that 
can undermine trade between RTA members and non-members (as well as between RTAs).  
Overall, however, the findings of this paper are encouraging: particularly RTAs formed by the 
original NAFTA partners liberalize the bulk of goods and do so rapidly, and the integration of 
the regional economies has been accompanied by multilateral tariff liberalization. RTAs in 
the Americas have also pushed the frontiers of such agreement disciplines as services and 
investment. Today’s challenge for the region, and the coming challenge for the Asian 
economies, is to manage the risks of the regional path: pursuing a path that is good both for 
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Table A1: RTAs Considered in the Study 
 
Agreement  Year of Entry into Effect 
NAFTA  4/1/1994 
Mexico-Bolivia  1/1/1995 
Mexico-Colombia-Venezuela  1/1/1995 
Canada-Chile  7/5/1997 
Mexico-Nicaragua  7/1/1998 
Chile-Mexico  8/1/1999 
Mexico-Northern Triangle  03/15/2001 (SV, GU), 06/01/2001 (HO), 03/14/2001 (MEX) 
Chile-Central America  02/15/2002 (CR), 06/03/2002 (SV) 
Central America-Dominican 
Republic  03/07/2002 (CR),10/04/2001 (SV), 10/03/2001(GU),12/19/2001 (HO) 
Canada-Costa Rica  11/1/2002 
US-Chile  1/1/2004 
Mexico-Uruguay  7/15/2004 
CAFTA  12/17/04 (SV), 03/03/2005 (HO), 03/10/05 (GU), 10/11/05 (NI), 
07/27/05 (US)
 * 
Mexico-Costa Rica  1/1/2005 
US-Peru  NA 
US-Colombia   NA 
Chile-Peru  7/1/1998  
Mercosur-Chile   1/10/1996 
Mercosur-Bolivia  02/28/1997  
ACE 58 
Peru – Mercosur 
ARG (12/14/2005); BRA (12/29/2005); PRY (02/15/2006); PER 
(12/12/2005); 12/16/2005) 
ACE 59 
PRY-COL,ECU&VEN (04/19/2005); ECU-ARG,BRA&URY 
(04/01/2005); BRA-VEN (02/01/2005); COL-ARG(02/01/2005); VEN-
ARG (01/05/2005); VEN- UR (01/05/2005) 
US-Israel  8/15/1985 
Canada-Israel  1/1/1997 
Mexico-Israel  7/1/2000 
EC-Mexico  7/1/2001 
EFTA-Mexico  7/1/2001 
US-Jordan   12/17/2001 
EC-Chile  2/1/2003 
US-Singapore  1/1/2004 
Chile-Republic of Korea  4/1/2004 
US-Australia  1/1/2005 
Mexico-Japan  4/1/2005 
Chile-New Zealand-
Singapore-Brunei Darussalam  6/3/2005 
US-Bahrain  12/13/2005* 
US-Morocco  1/1/2006 
Chile-PRC   10/01/2006 
                                                 
* Refer to ratification dates. ADBI Working Paper 277    Estevadeordal, Shearer, and Suominen 
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Panama-Singapore  07/24/2006  
Australia-New Zealand   3/28/1983 
COMESA  12/8/1994 
EC-Lithuania  1/1/1995 
EC-Romania  2/1/1995 
EC- South Africa  1/1/2000 
EC-Morocco  3/1/2000 
New Zealand-Singapore  1/1/2001 
Japan-Singapore  11/30/2002 
EFTA-Singapore  1/1/2003 
Singapore-Australia  7/28/2003 
PRC-Hong Kong, China  1/1/2004 
Australia-Thailand  1/1/2005 
New Zealand-Thailand  7/1/2005 














  Objective administration of measures 
  Tribunals and procedures for the review of administrative decisions 
  Duty to inform of the status and final decision on applications 
  Measures do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services 
Transparency provisions: 
  Prior comment  
  Duty to publish 
  National inquiry point 
  Duty to provide information to other members 
Recognition of qualifications:  
  Adequate opportunity for other interested members 
  Prohibition of discriminatory recognition 
Restrictions on transfer or payments 
Denial of benefits 
Telecommunications: 
  Interconnection  
  Unbundling 
  Particular services 
  Competitive safeguards 
  Universal Service Obligations 
  Allocation of scarce resources 
Financial Services: 
  Prudential carve-out 
  Provision for recognition of prudential measures 
  NT for access to payments and clearing systems 
  New financial services 
  Privacy 
  Data transfer 






Scope of application: 
  Establishment  
  Acquisition 
  Post-establishment operation 
  Resale 
MFN treatment 
National treatment 
Nationality of management and board of directors 
Performance requirements  
Transparency provisions:  
  Prior comment opportunity 
  Duty to Publish     
Denial of benefits  
Minimum standard of treatment  
Treatment in case of conflict 
Expropriation and compensation 
Transfers restrictions 
Investor-State disputes 
 